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Abstract
The interaction of competing agents is described by classical game theory. It is now well known
that this can be extended to the quantum domain, where agents obey the rules of quantum mechan-
ics. This is of emerging interest for exploring quantum foundations, quantum protocols, quantum
auctions, quantum cryptography, and the dynamics of quantum cryptocurrency, for example. In
this paper, we investigate two-player games in which a strategy pair can exist as a Nash equilibrium
when the games obey the rules of quantum mechanics. Using a generalized Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) setting for two-player quantum games, and considering a particular strategy pair, we
identify sets of games for which the pair can exist as a Nash equilibrium only when Bell’s inequality
is violated. We thus determine specific games for which the Nash inequality becomes equivalent to
Bell’s inequality for the considered strategy pair.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A quantum game [1–5] describes the strategic interaction among a set of players sharing
quantum states. Players’ strategic choices, or strategies [6–8], are local unitary transfor-
mations on the quantum state. The state evolves unitarily and finally the players’ payoffs,
or utilities, are obtained by measuring the entangled state. It turns out that under certain
situations sharing of an entangled quantum state can put the players in an advantageous
position and more efficient outcomes of the game can then emerge. For readers not familiar
with the formalism of quantum theory [9], sharing an entangled state can be considered
equivalent to the situation in which the players have (shared) access to a ‘quantum sys-
tem’ having some intrinsically non-classical aspects. A quantum game would then involve a
strategic manoeuvring of the shared quantum system in which different and perhaps more
efficient outcome(s) of the game can emerge due to non-classical aspect(s) of the shared
system.
Now, it is well known that non-classical, and thus apparently strange, aspects of a shared
quantum system can be expressed as constraints on probabilities relevant to the shared
system. Usually expressed as constraints in correlations, the famous Bell’s inequality [9–14]
can be re-expressed as constraints on the relevant joint probability and its marginals [15–18].
Essentially, Bell’s inequality emerges as being the necessary and sufficient condition requiring
a joint probability distribution to exist given a set of marginals. It is well known that Bell’s
inequality can be violated by a set of quantum mechanical probabilities—the probabilities
that are obtained by the quantum probability rule. This turns out to be the case even though
the quantum probabilities are normalized as the classical probabilities are. This is because
for a set of marginal (quantum) probabilities that are obtained via the quantum probability
rule, the corresponding joint probability distribution may not exist. The possibility to
express truly non-classical aspects of a quantum system in only probabilistic terms [19] has
led to suggestions for schemes of quantum games [26–28, 30, 33–35] that do not refer to
quantum states, unitary transformations, and/or the quantum measurement.
In a classical game allowing mixed strategies, the players’ strategies are convex linear
combinations, with real coefficients, of their pure strategies [8]. Players’ strategies in a
quantum game [2, 3], however, are unitary transformations and thus belong to much larger
strategy spaces. This led to the arguments [36] that quantum games can perhaps be viewed
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as extended classical games. In order to obtain an improved comparison between classical
and quantum games, it was suggested [24] that the players’ strategy sets need to be iden-
tical. This has motivated proposals [33–35] of quantum games in which players’ strategies
are classical, as being convex linear combinations (with real coefficients) of the classical
strategies, and the quantum game emerges from the non-classical aspects of a shared proba-
bilistic physical system—as expressed by the constraints on relevant probabilities and their
marginals [15–18].
In the usual approach in the area of quantum games [5], a classical game is defined, or
given, at the start and its quantum version is developed afterwards. The usual reasonable
requirement being that the classical mixed-strategy game can be recovered from the quantum
game. One then studies whether the quantum game offers any non-classical outcome(s).
In this paper, the players’ strategies in the quantum game remain classical whereas the
new quantum, or non-classical, outcome(s) of the game emerge from the peculiar quantum
probabilities relevant to the quantum system that two players share to play the game. In
contrast to the usual approach in quantum games, in which the players’ strategies are unitary
transformations, here we consider a particular classical strategy pair and then enquire about
the set of games for which that strategy pair can exist as a Nash equilibrium (NE) [6–8]. In
particular, for a given strategy pair, we investigate whether there are such games for which
that strategy pair can exist as a NE only when the corresponding Bell’s inequality is violated
by the quantum probabilities relevant to the shared quantum system.
We consider two-player games that can be played using the setting of generalized Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiments [9, 14, 19]. As is known, in this setting a probabilistic
version of Bell’s inequality can be obtained [15–19]. We consider particular strategies and
find the sets of games for which the strategies can exist as a NE only when Bell’s inequality
is violated. By identifying such games, we show that there exist strategic outcomes that
can only be realized when the game is played quantum mechanically and also only when the
corresponding Bell’s inequality is violated.
The connection between Bell’s inequality and the NE was originally reported in Ref. [20].
However, the Ref. [20] did not use an EPR setting. In the present paper, we show that
the mentioned connection becomes explicitly direct by using an EPR setting in playing a
quantum game.
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II. TWO-PLAYER QUANTUM GAMES USING THE EPR EXPERIMENT SET-
TING
The EPR setting for playing quantum games was introduced in Ref. [24] and was further
investigated in Refs. [25–32]. The Refs. [26–28, 30, 33–35] investigate using the setting of
generalized EPR experiments [19] for playing quantum games. This setting permits con-
sideration of a probabilistic version of the corresponding Bell’s inequality, which allows
construction of quantum games without referring to the mathematical formalism of quan-
tum mechanics including Hilbert space, unitary transformations, entangling operations, and
quantum measurements [9]. The relationship between the NE and aspects of Bell’s inequality
have been indicated in Refs. [21–23]. The present paper’s contribution consists of bringing
into focus this relationship and, in particular, finding the specific games for which this rela-
tionship can be explicitly defined. Moreover, in order to achieve this the present paper uses
EPR setting and the probabilistic version of Bell’s inequality.
In the setting of the generalized EPR experiment, Alice and Bob are spatially separated
and are unable to communicate with each other. In an individual run, both receive one half
of a pair of particles originating from a common source. In the same run of the experiment,
both players choose one from two given (pure) strategies. These strategies are the two
directions in space along which spin or polarization measurements can be made. We denote
these directions to be S1, S2 for Alice and S
′
1
, S ′
2
for Bob. Each measurement generates +1
or −1 as the outcome. Experimental results are recorded for a large number of individual
runs of the experiment. Payoffs are then awarded that depend on the directions the players
choose over many runs (defining the players’ strategies), the matrix of the game they play,
and the statistics of the measurement outcomes. For instance, we denote Pr(+1,+1;S1, S
′
1
)
as the probability of both Alice and Bob obtaining +1 when Alice selects the direction S1
whereas Bob selects the direction S ′
1
. We write ǫ1 for the probability Pr(+1,+1;S1, S
′
1
) and
ǫ8 for the probability Pr(−1,−1;S1, S ′2) and likewise one can then write down the relevant
probabilities as
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Alice
S1
+1
−1
S2
+1
−1
Bob
S ′
1
+1 −1
S ′
2
+1 −1
ǫ1 ǫ2
ǫ3 ǫ4
ǫ5 ǫ6
ǫ7 ǫ8
ǫ9 ǫ10
ǫ11 ǫ12
ǫ13 ǫ14
ǫ15 ǫ16
. (1)
Being normalized, EPR probabilities ǫi satisfy the relations
Σ4i=1ǫi = 1, Σ
8
i=5ǫi = 1, Σ
12
i=9ǫi = 1, Σ
16
i=13ǫi = 1. (2)
Consider in (1), for instance, the case when Alice plays her strategy S2 and Bob plays his
strategy S ′
1
. The two arms of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus are rotated along these two
directions and the quantum measurement is performed. According to the above table, the
probability that both experimental outcomes are −1 is then ǫ12. Similarly, the probability
that the observer 1’s experimental outcome is +1 and observer 2’s experimental outcome is
−1 is given by ǫ10. The other entries in (1) can similarly be explained. In the present paper,
the EPR setting is enforced and that the players can only choose between two directions.
We now consider a game between two players Alice and Bob, which is defined by the real
numbers ai and bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 16, and is given by
Alice
S1
S2
Bob
S ′
1
S ′
2
(a1, b1) (a2, b2)
(a3, b3) (a4, b4)
(a5, b5) (a6, b6)
(a7, b7) (a8, b8)
(a9, b9) (a10, b10)
(a11, b11) (a12, b12)
(a13, b13) (a14, b14)
(a15, b15) (a16, b16)
. (3)
For this game, we now define the players’ pure strategy payoff relations as
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ΠA,B(S1, S
′
1
) = Σ4i=1(ai, bi)ǫi, ΠA,B(S1, S
′
2
) = Σ8i=5(ai, bi)ǫi,
ΠA,B(S2, S
′
1
) = Σ12i=9(ai, bi)ǫi, ΠA,B(S2, S
′
2
) = Σ16i=13(ai, bi)ǫi, (4)
where ΠA(S1, S
′
2
), for example, is Alice’s payoff when she plays S1 and Bob plays S
′
2
.
It can be seen that in the way it is defined, the game is inherently probabilistic. That
is, in (3) the players’ payoffs even for their pure strategies assume an underlying probability
distribution as given by (1). Now, we can also define a mixed-strategy version of this game as
follows. Consider Alice playing the strategy S1 with probability p and the strategy S2 with
probability (1− p) whereas Bob playing the strategy S ′
1
with probability q and the strategy
S ′
2
with probability (1 − q). Using (3, 4) the players’ mixed strategy payoff relations can
then be obtained as
ΠA,B(p, q) =

 p
1− p


T 
ΠA,B(S1, S
′
1
) ΠA,B(S1, S
′
2
)
ΠA,B(S2, S
′
1
) ΠA,B(S2, S
′
2
)



 q
1− q

 . (5)
Assuming that the strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) is a NE, we then require
ΠA(p
⋆, q⋆)−ΠA(p, q⋆) > 0, ΠB(p⋆, q⋆)− ΠB(p⋆, q) > 0, (6)
that takes the form
ΠA(p
⋆, q⋆)− ΠA(p, q⋆) = (p⋆ − p)

 1
−1


T 
ΠA(S1, S
′
1
) ΠA(S1, S
′
2
)
ΠA(S2, S
′
1
) ΠA(S2, S
′
2
)



 q
⋆
1− q⋆

 ≥ 0,
ΠB(p
⋆, q⋆)− ΠB(p⋆, q) =

 p
⋆
1− p⋆


T 
ΠB(S1, S
′
1
) ΠB(S1, S
′
2
)
ΠB(S2, S
′
1
) ΠB(S2, S
′
2
)



 1
−1

 (q⋆ − q) ≥ 0. (7)
Note that the players’ strategies are classical whereas the game itself is not classical as
the underlying probabilities of the game are quantum mechanical as obtained from the EPR
experiments. Players’ payoffs are defined in terms of EPR quantum probabilities that can
violate Bell’s inequalities. Thus a classical game can in no way model this quantum game.
This setting also circumvents the criticism of Enk and Pike [36] on quantum games. Enk
and Pike noted that as the players in the quantum game have access to much larger strategy
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sets, the quantum game can be considered as another classical game with an extended set of
classical strategies. In the considered setting, players’ strategy sets are identical in both the
classical and quantum games and players’ payoff relations are obtained from an underlying
probability distribution that is quantum mechanical.
Although this game is played using the setting of generalized EPR experiments, in which
the players strategies consist of choosing between two directions, one can notice that under
appropriate conditions, the game can be reduced to the usual mixed-strategy version of the
standard two-player two-strategy noncooperative game. Non-cooperative games [6–8] were
investigated in the early work [2, 3] on quantum games. To see this, we consider the case
when
ai(1 ≤ i ≤ 4) = α, bi(1 ≤ i ≤ 4) = α,
ai(5 ≤ i ≤ 8) = β, bi(5 ≤ i ≤ 8) = γ,
ai(9 ≤ i ≤ 12) = γ, bi(9 ≤ i ≤ 12) = β,
ai(13 ≤ i ≤ 16) = δ, bi(13 ≤ i ≤ 16) = δ, (8)
and then from Eqs. (4) and (2) we obtain
ΠA,B(S1, S
′
1
) = αΣ4i=1ǫi = α,
ΠA(S1, S
′
2
) = βΣ8i=5ǫi,= β, ΠB(S1, S
′
2
) = γΣ8i=5ǫi,= γ,
ΠA(S2, S
′
1
) = γΣ12i=9ǫi = γ, ΠB(S2, S
′
1
) = βΣ12i=9ǫi = β,
ΠA,B(S2, S
′
2
) = δΣ16i=13ǫi = δ. (9)
In view of (6), Nash inequalities for the strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) then take the form
ΠA(p
⋆, q⋆)−ΠA(p, q⋆) = (p⋆ − p)

 1
−1


T 
α β
γ δ



 q
⋆
1− q⋆

 ≥ 0,
ΠB(p
⋆, q⋆)− ΠB(p⋆, q) =

 p
⋆
1− p⋆


T 
α γ
β δ



 1
−1

 (q⋆ − q) ≥ 0, (10)
which give us Nash inequalities for the mixed strategy (p⋆, q⋆) for the following symmetric
game
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
 (α, α) (β, γ)
(γ, β) (δ, δ)

 . (11)
When β < δ < α < γ this game results in the well known game of Prisoners’ Dilemma. As
is well known, for this game (p⋆, q⋆) = (0, 0) comes out as the unique NE.
A. Cereceda’s analysis and the probabilitsic version of CHSH sum of correlations
A convenient solution of the system (2, 33) was reported by Cereceda in [19]
and given in the Appendix A. Cereceda expressed the set of probabilities υ =
{ǫ2, ǫ3, ǫ6, ǫ7, ǫ10, ǫ11, ǫ13, ǫ16} in terms of the remaining set of probabilities i.e.
µ = {ǫ1, ǫ4, ǫ5, ǫ8, ǫ9, ǫ12, ǫ14, ǫ15} , (12)
and thus the elements of the set µ can be considered as independent variables.
In a particular run of the EPR experiment, the requirements of locality dictate that the
outcome of +1 or −1 (obtained along the direction S1 or direction S2) is independent of
whether the direction S ′
1
or the direction S ′
2
is chosen in that run. Similarly, the outcome
of +1 or −1 (obtained along S ′
1
or S ′
2
) is independent of whether the direction S1 or the
direction S2 is chosen in that run. These locality requirements when translated in terms of
the probability set ǫj can be expressed as Eqs. (33) in Appendix A.
Relevant to the EPR setting is the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) form of Bell’s
inequality that is usually expressed in terms of the correlations 〈S1S ′1〉, 〈S1S ′2〉, 〈S2S ′1〉,
〈S2S ′2〉. Using (1) the correlation 〈S1S ′1〉, for instance, can be obtained as
〈S1S ′1〉 = Pr(S1 = 1, S ′1 = 1)− Pr(S1 = 1, S ′1 = −1)
−Pr(S1 = −1, S ′1 = +1) + Pr(S1 = −1, S ′1 = −1)
= ǫ1 − ǫ2 − ǫ3 + ǫ4. (13)
Expressions for the correlations 〈S1S ′2〉, 〈S2S ′1〉, and 〈S2S ′2〉 can similarly be obtained. The
CHSH sum of correlations is given as
∆ = 〈S1S ′1〉+ 〈S1S ′2〉+ 〈S2S ′1〉 − 〈S2S ′2〉 , (14)
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and the CHSH inequality stating that |∆| ≤ 2 holds for any theory of local hidden variables.
The set of constraints on probabilities ǫi that are imposed by Tsirelson’s bound [37] state
that the quantum prediction of the CHSH sum of correlations ∆, defined in (14), is bounded
in absolute value by 2
√
2 i.e. |∆QM | ≤ 2
√
2. Taking into account [19] the normalization
condition (2), the quantity ∆ can equivalently be expressed as
∆ = 2(ǫ1 + ǫ4 + ǫ5 + ǫ8 + ǫ9 + ǫ12 + ǫ14 + ǫ15 − 2). (15)
Bell’s inequality can thus be written as 0 ≤ (2− |∆|) and is violated when the discriminant
(2 − |∆|) < 0. Bell’s inequality is thus violated when the discriminant attains a negative
value that occurs when either ∆ > 2 or ∆ < −2.
III. GAMES FOR WHICH NASH INEQUALITIES INVOLVE CHSH SUM OF
CORRELATIONS
We note from (7) that Nash inequalities for the strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) = (1/2, 1/2) take
the form
ΠA(1/2, 1/2)− ΠA(p, 1/2) =
(1/2)(1/2− p) [ΠA(S1, S ′1) + ΠA(S1, S ′2)−ΠA(S2, S ′1)− ΠA(S2, S ′2)] ≥ 0, (16)
ΠB(1/2, 1/2)− ΠB(1/2, q) =
(1/2)(1/2− q) [ΠB(S1, S ′1)− ΠB(S1, S ′2) + ΠB(S2, S ′1)−ΠB(S2, S ′2)] ≥ 0, (17)
which hold in order for the strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) = (1/2, 1/2) to exist as a NE. Now, the
presence of the terms (1/2− p) in (16) and (1/2− q) in (17) forces both expressions within
the square brackets to be identically zero. Nash inequalities for the strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) =
(1/2, 1/2), therefore, cannot be expressed in terms of the discriminant (2−|∆|). That is, the
strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) = (1/2, 1/2) cannot exist as a NE when Bell’s inequality is violated.
We therefore consider a second example of the strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) = (1, 1/2) that allows
us to establish a direct connection between Bell’s inequality and Nash inequality.
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Theorem 1 For the set of games for which
ΠA(S2, S
′
1
) + ΠA(S2, S
′
2
)− ΠA(S1, S ′1)− ΠA(S1, S ′2) = 2− |∆| , (18)
ΠB(S1, S
′
1
)− ΠB(S1, S ′2) = 0, (19)
the strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) = (1, 1/2) exists as a NE when Bell’s inequality is violated.
Proof. Nash inequalities (7) for the strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) = (1, 1/2) take the form:
ΠA(1, 1/2)− ΠA(p, 1/2) =
−(1/2)(1− p) [ΠA(S2, S ′1) + ΠA(S2, S ′2)−ΠA(S1, S ′1)− ΠA(S1, S ′2)] ≥ 0, (20)
ΠB(1, 1/2)−ΠA(1, q) =
[ΠB(S1, S
′
1
)− ΠB(S1, S ′2)] (1/2− q) ≥ 0. (21)
Now, the inequality (20) can hold when the term in square bracket is negative or zero.
As Bell’s inequality is violated when the discriminant (2−|∆|) is negative, therefore, for the
set of games that are defined by the conditions (29, 31) the strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) = (1, 1/2)
exists as a NE when Bell’s inequality is violated.
For the set of games defined by the following conditions the strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) =
(1, 1/2) exists as a NE when Bell’s inequality is violated, for 0 ≤ ∆,
b1 = b2 = b5 = b6 and b3 = b4 = b7 = b8,
a2 = −a5 + a12 + a15, a3 = a1 + a4 + a5 − a12 − a15 − 4,
a6 = a4 + a5 + a8 − a12 − a15 − 4, a7 = −a4 + a12 + a15,
a9 = a1 + a4 + a5 + a8 − a12 − a14 − a15 − 4,
a10 = a4 + a8 − a14, a11 = a1 + a5 − a15,
a13 = −a4 − a8 + a12 + a14 + a15 + 4, a16 = a4 + a8 − a12, (22)
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and for ∆ < 0, the same is true for the set of games that is defined by these conditions:
b1 = b2 = b5 = b6 and b3 = b4 = b7 = b8,
a2 = −a5 + a12 + a15 − 4, a3 = a1 + a4 + a5 − a12 − a15 + 8,
a6 = a4 + a5 + a8 − a12 − a15 + 8, a7 = −a4 + a12 + a15 − 4,
a9 = a1 + a4 + a5 + a8 − a12 − a14 − a15 + 12,
a10 = a4 + a8 − a14 + 4, a11 = a1 + a5 − a15 + 4,
a13 = −a4 − a8 + a12 + a14 + a15 − 8, a16 = a4 + a8 − a12 + 4. (23)
Proof. Using Eqs. (4) we write Eqs. (18, 19) as,
Σ12i=9aiǫi + Σ
16
i=13aiǫi − Σ4i=1aiǫi − Σ8i=5aiǫi = 2− |∆| , (24)
Σ4i=1biǫi − Σ8i=5biǫi = 0. (25)
Now, using Eq. (12), the left sides of Eq. (24) can then be expressed in terms of the proba-
bilities from the set µ as follows:
Σ12i=9aiǫi + Σ
16
i=13aiǫi − Σ4i=1aiǫi − Σ8i=5aiǫi =
(ǫ1/2)(−2a1 + a2 + a3 − a6 + a7 − a10 + a11 − a13 + a16)+
(ǫ4/2)(−2a4 + a2 + a3 + a6 − a7 + a10 − a11 + a13 − a16)+
(ǫ5/2)(−2a5 − a2 + a3 + a6 + a7 + a10 − a11 + a13 − a16)+
(ǫ8/2)(−2a8 + a2 − a3 + a6 + a7 − a10 + a11 − a13 + a16)+
(ǫ9/2)(2a9 + a2 − a3 + a6 − a7 − a10 − a11 + a13 − a16)+
(ǫ12/2)(2a12 − a2 + a3 − a6 + a7 − a10 − a11 − a13 + a16)+
(ǫ14/2)(2a14 − a2 + a3 − a6 + a7 + a10 − a11 − a13 − a16)+
(ǫ15/2)(2a15 + a2 − a3 + a6 − a7 − a10 + a11 − a13 − a16)+
(1/2)(−a2 − a3 − a6 − a7 + a10 + a11 + a13 + a16) = 2− |∆| . (26)
Similarly, the left side of Eq. (25) now takes the form:
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Σ4i=1biǫi − Σ8i=5biǫi =
(ǫ1/2)(2b1 − b2 − b3 − b6 + b7) + (ǫ4/2)(−b2 − b3 + 2b4 + b6 − b7)+
(ǫ5/2)(b2 − b3 − 2b5 + b6 + b7) + (ǫ8/2)(−b2 + b3 + b6 + b7 − 2b8)+
(ǫ9/2)(−b2 + b3 + b6 − b7) + (ǫ12/2)(b2 − b3 − b6 + b7)+
(ǫ14/2)(b2 − b3 − b6 + b7) + (ǫ15/2)(−b2 + b3 + b6 − b7)+
(1/2)(b2 + b3 − b6 − b7) = 0. (27)
As the probabilities in the set µ are considered independent, comparing the two sides of
Eq. (27) leads us to obtain:
b1 = b2 = b5 = b6 and b3 = b4 = b7 = b8. (28)
Consider now the right side of Eq. (26). As ∆ = 2(ǫ1+ ǫ4+ ǫ5+ ǫ8+ ǫ9+ ǫ12+ ǫ14+ ǫ15− 2),
the discriminant (2−|∆|) can be negative for the following two cases: a) For case 0 ≤ ∆, we
have 2− |∆| = 2−∆. The rank of the system (26) is 7. We take a1, a4, a5, a8, a12, a14, a15 as
independently chosen constants and compare the coefficients of the independent probabilities
in the set µ on the two sides of Eq. (26). This gives the set of conditions (22). That is,
for the set of games defined by the conditions (28, 22) the strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) = (1, 1/2)
exists as a NE when the Bell’s inequality is violated. For case ∆ < 0, we have |∆| = −∆
and 2− |∆| = 2+∆. Following the steps from the last case, we obtain the set of conditions
(23). As before, for the set of games that are defined by the conditions (28, 23), the strategy
pair (p⋆, q⋆) = (1, 1/2) exists as a NE when the Bell’s inequality is violated.
IV. AN EXAMPLE
As a specific example, and in view of Eqs. (28), we assign the value of 1 arbitrarily to
b1, b2, b5, b6 and also the same value to b3, b4, b7, b8. Also, as Eq. (25) does not involve the
constants b9, b10, b11, b12, b13, b14, b15, b16 we also assign the value of 1 to them. Likewise,
we assign the value of 1 to the independently chosen constants a1, a4, a5, a8, a12, a14, a15.
With reference to Eqs. (22, 23) we obtain the following two games,
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Alice
S1
S2
Bob
S ′
1
S ′
2
(1, 1) (1, 1)
(−3, 1) (1, 1)
(1, 1) (−3, 1)
(1, 1) (1, 1)
(−3, 1) (1, 1)
(1, 1) (1, 1)
(5, 1) (1, 1)
(1, 1) (1, 1)
, (29)
for which we consider the strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) = (1, 1/2). We use Eqs. (26) under the
assumption 0 ≤ ∆, where ∆ is defined by Eq. (15), to obtain Nash inequalities for the game
(29) as
ΠA(1, 1/2)− ΠA(p, 1/2) = −(1/2)(1− p) [2−∆] ≥ 0,
ΠB(1, 1/2)− ΠA(1, q) = 0. (30)
As 0 ≤ (1− p) ≤ 1, for this game, the strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) = (1, 1/2) exists as a NE when
2 < ∆. The converse is also true in that when 2 < ∆ the strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) = (1, 1/2)
becomes a NE. That is, for the considered game and the strategy pair, Nash and Bell’s
inequalities become equivalent.
Alice
S1
S2
Bob
S ′
1
S ′
2
(1, 1) (−3, 1)
(9, 1) (1, 1)
(1, 1) (9, 1)
(−3, 1) (1, 1)
(13, 1) (5, 1)
(5, 1) (1, 1)
(−7, 1) (1, 1)
(1, 1) (5, 1)
. (31)
Similarly, now considering the game (31) for the same strategy pair, we obtain Nash in-
equalities for the strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) = (1, 1/2) as follows and with the assumption that
∆ < 0,
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ΠA(1, 1/2)− ΠA(p, 1/2) = −(1/2)(1− p) [2 + ∆] ≥ 0,
ΠB(1, 1/2)− ΠA(1, q) = 0. (32)
For this game, the strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) = (1, 1/2) exists as a NE when ∆ < −2. The
converse is also true in that when ∆ < −2 the strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) = (1, 1/2) becomes a
NE. That is, for the considered game and the strategy pair, Nash and Bell’s inequalities
becomes equivalent. The strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) = (1, 1/2) therefore exists as a NE in both
the games (29, 31) when Bell’s inequality is violated.
As (29, 31) are especially-designed games, their classical versions do not have an existing
name. The behavior of these games changes from their quantum pay-off versions in that the
particular mixed strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) = (1, 1/2) can exist only in the quantum versions of
these games.
V. DISCUSSION
In the quantum games considered in this paper, the players’ strategies are classical consist-
ing of convex linear combinations—with real coefficients—of their pure classical strategies,
whereas the players’ payoffs are obtained directly from the set of quantum probabilities that
underlie the playing of the game. We consider the probabilistic form of Bell’s inequality
that can be violated by the set of quantum probabilities. We then show that there exist
such games in which a classical pair of strategies can be a NE only when the underlying
probabilities of the game are truly quantum mechanical in that they violate Bell’s inequality.
In the usual approach to quantum games, a game is given, or known, and pairs of quantum
strategies, consisting of unitary transformations, are determined that constitute a NE. In a
striking contrast this usual approach, a classical strategy pair is considered as given whereas
the set of games is then determine for which that classical strategy pair becomes a NE only
when Bell’s inequality is violated.
Some of the earliest criticisms [36] of quantum games questioned whether such games
are genuinely quantum mechanical. It was suggested that the violation of Bell’s inequality
can decidedly determine whether a quantum game is genuinely quantum or not. Although
deriving Bell’s inequality does not require quantum theory, its violation is a well established
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feature that is achieveable only in the truely quantum mechanical regime.
As the players’ strategies even in the quantum game are restricted to the classical ones,
and the players’ payoff relations are obtained from the set of underlying quantum me-
chanical probabilities, our approach is not susceptible to the Enk and Pike type argument
[36]—stating that a quantum game with quantum mechanical strategies can be considered
equivalent to another extended classical game. In our approach this criticism is avoided as
the players’ strategies in both the classical and quantum games remain identical.
The generalized EPR setting used in this paper assumes that the repeated runs of the
EPR experiment are performed in order to obtain the expected values of quantum mechanical
observables. In particular, it is not the case that the measurement outcomes of an individual
run lead to the players revising their strategic moves in the next run in view of their payoffs
in the previous run, as is the case in repeated games. A study of repeated quantum games
using generalized EPR experiments is an open question for future work.
Note that although the players’ strategies are classical, quantum mechanics is central
to the setting of the considered quantum game. Players’ payoff relations have underlying
quantum probability distributions. The physical system that is used to play this game is the
standard EPR type apparatus involving Stern-Gerlach type measurements. Local unitary
transformations are used as the players’ strategies in the standard schemes to play quantum
games whereas classical strategies, akin to rotating the arms of an EPR apparatus, are
the players’ strategies in this present paper [24–32]. We identify sets of games in which,
for a considered classical mixed strategy, the Nash inequality becomes equivalent to Bell’s
inequality.
The results of this paper can be extended to multi-player games. This would involve
consideration of the N-partite Bell’s inequality [38]—a situation in which use of geometric
algebra has been shown to offer a tractable setting for the analysis of N-partite interac-
tions [32]. Also, consideration of two-player games with multi strategies will involve Bell’s
inequalities with many observables [39].
Appendix A
When translated in terms of the probability set ǫj , the locality requirements can be
expressed as
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ǫ1 + ǫ2 = ǫ5 + ǫ6, ǫ1 + ǫ3 = ǫ9 + ǫ11,
ǫ9 + ǫ10 = ǫ13 + ǫ14, ǫ5 + ǫ7 = ǫ13 + ǫ15,
ǫ3 + ǫ4 = ǫ7 + ǫ8, ǫ11 + ǫ12 = ǫ15 + ǫ16,
ǫ2 + ǫ4 = ǫ10 + ǫ12, ǫ6 + ǫ8 = ǫ14 + ǫ16.
(33)
Cereceda [19] reports a convenient solution of the system (2, 33) for which the set of prob-
abilities υ = {ǫ2, ǫ3, ǫ6, ǫ7, ǫ10, ǫ11, ǫ13, ǫ16} is expressed in terms of the remaining set of
probabilities i.e.
ǫ2 = (1− ǫ1 − ǫ4 + ǫ5 − ǫ8 − ǫ9 + ǫ12 + ǫ14 − ǫ15)/2,
ǫ3 = (1− ǫ1 − ǫ4 − ǫ5 + ǫ8 + ǫ9 − ǫ12 − ǫ14 + ǫ15)/2,
ǫ6 = (1 + ǫ1 − ǫ4 − ǫ5 − ǫ8 − ǫ9 + ǫ12 + ǫ14 − ǫ15)/2,
ǫ7 = (1− ǫ1 + ǫ4 − ǫ5 − ǫ8 + ǫ9 − ǫ12 − ǫ14 + ǫ15)/2,
ǫ10 = (1− ǫ1 + ǫ4 + ǫ5 − ǫ8 − ǫ9 − ǫ12 + ǫ14 − ǫ15)/2,
ǫ11 = (1 + ǫ1 − ǫ4 − ǫ5 + ǫ8 − ǫ9 − ǫ12 − ǫ14 + ǫ15)/2,
ǫ13 = (1− ǫ1 + ǫ4 + ǫ5 − ǫ8 + ǫ9 − ǫ12 − ǫ14 − ǫ15)/2,
ǫ16 = (1 + ǫ1 − ǫ4 − ǫ5 + ǫ8 − ǫ9 + ǫ12 − ǫ14 − ǫ15)/2.
(34)
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